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CURRENT LEGISLATION
Editor-WILLIAM J. CAHILL
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW-PRPOSED AMENDMENT-EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION ON ACCOUNT OF RACE, CREED OR COLOR.-In the
5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a guaranty
is made to the individual that he shall not be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law. The 14th Amendment, ex-
pressly forbids a state from so depriving an individual of life, lib-
erty or property. What receives protection within the meaning of
"life, liberty or property" was interpreted in the case of Allgeyer v.
Louisiana,1 as follows:
"The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physi-
cal restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term
is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in
the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them
in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any liveli-
hood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter all contracts
which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carry-
ing out to a successful conclusion the purposes above men-
tioned."
In accord with the latter part of the foregoing quotation, the
courts recognize the right of the individual to freely choose any law-
ful pursuit 2 and, for the purpose of enabling him to bring to a suc-
cessful conclusion such profession, the right to freely contract.3
Both are inalienable rights protected by the guaranty of personal
liberty and property. Among the inalienable rights of every citizen
are found the rights to freely contract for the acquisition of prop-
' 165 U. S. 578, 589, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 429 (1897).
'People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 386, 2 N. E. 29, 52 Am. Rep. 34, wherein
the court, per Rapallo, J., said, "Among these, no proposition is now more
firmly settled than that it is one of the fundamental rights and privileges of
every American citizen to adopt and follow such lawful industrial pursuit,
not injurious to the community, as he may see fit." See People v. Hawkins,
157 N. Y. 1, 8, 51 N. E. 257 (1898).
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 545, 791, 43 Sup. Ct. 394
(1923), "That the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty
of the individual protected by this clause is settled by the decisions of this
court, and is no longer open to question"; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R. Co. et al. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 31 Sup. Ct. 259 (1911) ; Lochner v.
People, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905); Frisbie v. United States, 157
U. S. 160, 15 Sup. Ct. 586 (1895); Wolff Packing Co. v. Ct. of Ind. Rel.,
262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1922).
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erty; 4 to set the terms and the price at which his private property
will be disposed of; r to invest his money in any lawful enterprise; 6
and, finally, to fix the terms at which he will hire or be hired. 7 Quite
obvious is the necessity of the freedom of the individual in the above
respects to insure both to himself and the nation, prosperity and
success.
Although freedom of contract is the general rule, a limitation
is placed upon it by the valid exercise of police power.8 It is ele-
mentary that the use of one's rights be restricted to a use not in con-
flict with the rights of others. An enactment under the exercise
of police power, abridging the right to contract, to be valid must
have a reasonable tendency to promote the public health, safety,
morals or welfare,9 exceptional circumstances necessitating the act
for the benefit of the public health, safety, morals or welfare.'0
However, a purely aesthetic purpose is not sufficient justification, and
personal rights and private property may not be so invaded under
the guise of police power." The Constitution represents the supreme
law of the land, and the restraints which it imposes must not be
exceeded by any arbitrary interference with personal rights.' 2 No
conflict exists between the individual's right of freedom of contract
and the state's right to enact such legislation as is a valid exercise
of police power,13 but to be such, that power is required, when exer-
' See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 14, 446, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1915);
People v. Hawkins, mspra note 2.
'People v. Hawkins, supra note 2, 7. O'Brien, J., writing in that case,
stated that, "A law which interferes with property by depriving the owner
of the profitable and free use of it, or hampers him in the application of it
for the purposes of trade or commerce, or imposes conditions upon the right
to hold or sell it, may seriously impair its value, against which the Consti-
tution is a protection." Tyson & Bro. et al. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup.
Ct. 426 (1927).
' Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brower, Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U. S. 197, 361 (1904).
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra note 3; Frisbie v. United States,
supra note 3; Coppage v. Kansas, supra note 4; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek,
259 U. S. 530, 42 Sup. Ct. 516 (1922) ; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161,
28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908); Hitchman C. & C. Co. v. Mitchell et al., 245 U. S.
229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917).8Ibid.; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co.-Op. Ass'n,
276 U. S. 71 (1928) ; Lochner v. New York, supra note 3.
'Ibid.; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612(1914); BLACK, CNSTITUTIONAL LAW, p. 424; WILLOUGHBY, THE ConSTITU-
TioN, Vol. II, p. 1233.
Tyson & Bro. et al. v. Banton, supra note 5; Adkins v. Children's Hos-
pital, supra note 3; Wolff Packing Co. v. Ct. of Ind. Rel., supra note 3.h Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra note 3; Wolff Packing Co. v. Ct.
of Ind. Rel., supra note 3; City of Syracuse v. Snow et al., 123 Misc. 568
(1924).
" Hardware Dealors Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. et al., supra note 8;
In the Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 A. R. 636 (1885).
'Allgeyer v. Louisiana, supra note 1; Frisbie v. United States, supra
note 3.
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cised, to have a substantial relation to the furtherance of the public
health, safety, morals or welfare.
Recently in the New York Legislature a bill, providing
"that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corpora-
tion, or for any officer, agent or employee thereof, to refuse
to employ any person in any capacity in the business of such
person, firm or corporation, on account of race, creed or
color of such person seeking such employment," 14
was introduced. For its objective the bill has the procuring of the
social equality of all individuals in their quest for employment. Can
that objective be justified at the expense of an abridgement of the
right to contract, a constitutional right? Freedom of absolute choice
of an employee is to be denied the employer thereby, for no con-
sideration can be given by him to the applicant's race, color or creed.
The proposed bill as a prospective invader of the constitutional rights
of the individual must come within the valid exercise of police power
or failing that, it is unconstitutional.
For the promotion of the public welfare and safety, the regula-
tion of junk dealers 15 and banking concerns, 16 the licensing of ven-
dors of cigarettes,17 and dealers in corporate or quasi corporate se-
curities,' 8 the requiring a railroad to remove a bridge and to replace
it with a larger bridge so as to permit the widening of a creek for
drainage purposes 19 and to maintain suitable crossings across the
railroad right of way together with ditches and drains along each
side of its roadbed 20 and the prohibiting the maintenance of pool
rooms 21 have been justified. The bill does not in any way aid the
public welfare or safety nor does it prohibit or regulate a dangerous
trade or the making of a contract nmalm per se.
Protection of the public health necessitated the limiting of hours
of employment in hazardous occupations, 22 the limiting of the hours
of employment of women 23 and the passing of state prohibition acts.24
No claim whatever can be made that the public health is here in-
" Assembly Pr. A. 373, Introduced January 20th, 1932.
"Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 33 Sup. Ct. 27 (1912).
16 Noble State Bank v. Haskell et aL., 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911).
' Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 20 Sup. Ct. 633 (1900).
'Hall v. Geiger Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 Sup. Ct. 217 (1870).
" Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Grimwood et al., 200 U. S. 561,
26 Sup. Ct. 341 (1905).
' Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 35 Sup. Ct. 678 (1915).
'Murphy v. People, 225 U. S. 623, 32 Sup. Ct. 697 (1912).
'Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383 (1898).
Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671, 34 Sup. Ct 469 (1914) ; Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (1908).
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 123, 8 Sup. Ct. 273 (1887).
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volved. Neither does it deal with the regulation of interstate com-
merce 25 or the prevention of monopolies. 26
A business affected with a public interest because of its quasi
public nature, is subject to reasonable regulation. For that reason,
the regulation of hours of labor of municipal or state employees 2 7
of contracts of fire insurance companies, 28 and of the rates to be
charged the public by public service corporations have been held to
be a reasonable exercise of police power.29  Such an enactment is
Section 40 of the Civil Rights Law of the State of New York,30
providing for equal rights in places of public accommodation and for-
bidding owners thereof from refusing admission to any person be-
cause of race, creed or color. That all men are equal is the theory
behind the foregoing section as well as the bill, but in the former the
theory is applied solely to businesses devoted to a public use, whereas,
the latter goes much further and would apply to both private and
public businesses, a most vital distinction. Seeking the equality of
employees, the act would result in inequality between employer and
employee, in that the employer would not have the same freedom of
contract as the employee, who is not forbidden to discriminate against
an employer because of race, creed or color and, as such, it is an
arbitrary interference with the right to contract. 31
The constitutionality of Civil Rights Law Sec. 40 was upheld
in People v. King.32  In that case the defendant, an owner of a
skating rink, was fined for refusing admission to some colored per-
sons. It was pointed out by the court that the quasi public nature
of that business permitted the reasonable curtailment of the owner's
right to contract and went on to say that
"the statute does not interfere with private entertainments
or prevent persons not engaged in the business of keeping
a place of public amusement from regulating admission to
'Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 31 Sup.
Ct. 164 (1910).
-' Central Lumber Co. v. So. Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 33 Sup. Ct. 66 (1912).
'Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124 (1903).
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, supra note 9.
SWilcox et al. v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19 (1909).
' A new section to the Civil Rights Law was passed on March 16th, 1932,
to be known as Section 40a. It provides that no inquiry may be made as to
the religion or religious affiliations of persons seeking employment in the public
schools. Although it appears to be similar to the bill, there is a vast difference
since the section invades no individual rights and applies solely where govern-
ment is the employer.
'Adair v. United States, mepra note 7. In discussing employment con-
tracts the court there said that, "it is not within the functions of government
-at least, in the absence of contract between the parties--to compel any per-
son, in the course of his business and against his will to accept or retain the
personal services of another, or to compel any person against his will, to per-
form services for another."
.2 110 N. Y. 418, IS N. E. 245, 1 L. R. A. 293 (1888).
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social, public or private entertainments given by them as
they deem best, nor does it seek to compel social equality."
Had it done so, the decision would have been otherwise. But, social
equality in a limited narrow sense is the very end which the proposed
section would attain.
Were the bill to deal solely with businesses of a public nature,
it still unreasonably interferes with personal rights and should be
condemned. That a business is devoted to a public use does not
deprive the owner of all control of it,33 for no distinction can be
made between the hiring of employees for a public business and for
a private business. The right of one is as personal as the right of
the other and possessing the same constitutional protection.
The bill is an unlawful interference with property rights, against
which the constitution affords a guard. To permit this bill to be-
come law, would be a serious attack upon a sound business policy.
In a contract there must be a meeting of the minds, a mutual assent
to the terms.3 4 Harmony between employer and employee forms
the foundation for a prosperous business, public or private, and the
lack of it presents a serious barrier to success. But how can there
be assent to the contract if the employer has any objection whatever
to the applicant, and how can there be harmony in a forced, unde-
sired relationship?
Any discrimination because of race, creed or color would be
barred. Is it not overlooking the fact that they often play an im-
portant part in the carrying on of a business, and that even at times
it becomes a necessity to have an employee of a particular race or
color or creed? Imagine the handicap of one of foreign extraction
selling articles in a foreign settlement of a nationality different from
his own. Nor should it depend solely on necessity. Any prefer-
ence an employer has, irrespective of whether it be logical, neces-
sary or otherwise, ought not to be denied him. It is a private affair,
in which outsiders have no right. 35 Suppose a hotel has a prefer-
ence for bell hops of the colored race, and, wishing to maintain uni-
formity, refuses to hire one of the white race, by the terms of this
bill the hotel, acting so, would subject itself to penalization. Such
a situation manifestly shows the unreasonableness of the bill, un-
justified by any advantage to public health, safety, morals or welfare.
Employment contracts should be regarded as sacred things, hav-
ing the attribute of the greatest freedom and requiring the strictest
Wolff Packing Co. v. Ct. of Ind. Rel., supra note 3. A regulation giv-
ing to a commission to determine the amount of wages to be paid in certain
trades and prohibiting the use of any other wage was there held unconstitu-
tional. Chief Justice Taft at p. 539 said, "To say that a business is clothed
with a public interest is not to import that the public may take over its entire
management and run it at the expense of the owner."
" WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (1920), Vol. I, Sec. 18, p. 17.
'Adair v. United States, supra note 7. See note 31.
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caution to be used in placing any limitation upon them, and such
limitation to be justified only in the most exceptional cases, such as
the hours of labor in hazardous employments and the hours of labor
for women, and so the courts have considered them.36 But, even
in those cases, the choice of the individual of his employee is un-
affected, for the regulation merely goes to a part of the contract.
An enactment which gave to a board the determination of the mini-
mum wage to be paid to women employees, and making it unlaw-
ful for employers to hire at a smaller wage, was declared unconsti-
tutional in the case of Adkhins v. Children's Hospital. Speaking of
employment contracts, the court in that case said:
"Within this liberty are contracts of employment of
labor. In making such contracts, generally speaking, the
parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the
best terms they can as the result of private bargaining." 
Quoted in the same opinion was the following from Adair v. United
States:
"The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms
as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right
of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon
which he will accept such labor from the person offering
to sell. * :: * In all such particulars the employer and em-
ployee have equality of right, and any legislation that dis-
turbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the
liberty of contract which no government can legally justify
in a free land." 38
Any law which would invade the right to contract so unreasonably
as this bill would and which would be so detrimental to business,
without adding anything to the public health, safety, morals or wel-
fare, can not be justified merely because it has an aesthetic aim,
which in this instance is an imperfect social equality.
Should the bill be passed, it would have little if any effect. A
refusal to admit to a public accommodation on grounds not based
on race, creed or color is not prohibited by Civil Rights Law, Sec.
40.39 An intoxicated person may rightfully be excluded. So too,
under the proposed bill only discrimination on account of race, color
or creed is forbidden. There is, for example, no penalty if the
" Coppage v. Kansas, supra note 4; Adair v. United States, supra note 7;
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra note 3.1 Supra note 3, 545. A case similarly holding the determination of wages
by a commission to be unconstitutional is Wolff Packing Co. v. Ct. of Ind.
Rel., supra note 3.
Supra note 7, 174.
r Grannan v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 153 N. Y. 449, 47 N. E. 896
(1897).
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employer refuses to hire and gives as his reason, lack of ability of
the applicant. Yet that very employer might not be hiring because
of race, color or creed but there is no reason other than the employer
who is the judge of the ability of the applicant. Nor need the em-
ployer give any reason if he did hire and immediately thereafter dis-
charged the employee. 40 As a result, it would seem that unless the
employer expressed discrimination because of the applicant's race,
color or creed, there would be little efficacy to the act. That the
convictions under such a statute would be few indeed is quite evi-
dent.
GE ORGE J. SCHAEFER.
THE "YELLOW DoG" CONTRnAcT.-The campaign waged by or-
ganized labor on the so-called "yellow dog" 1 contract gained legisla-
tive sanction in 1887, when the New York Legislature passed a
statute making it a misdemeanor for "any * * * employer * * * (to)
coerce or compel any * * * employee to enter into any agreement
* * * nor to join or become a member of any labor organization,
as a condition of such person securing employment, or continuing
in the employment of any such employer." 2
Similar statutes were passed in fourteen states, and Congress
not only imposed a similar restriction on interstate carriers but
in addition forbade discrimination against employees by reason of
their membership in labor unions.3
These attempts to make use of criminal sanction to outlaw the
anti-union contract fell under constitutional laws as constituting an
unconstitutional interference with liberty of contract.4
" Coppage v. Kansas, supra note 4, 10, "So the right of the employee to
quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right
of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the service of such
employee." See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, supra note 7.
1 Such a contract usually provides that the employer will run his business
non-union and that the employee will not become a member of any labor union
during the course of his employment nor molest, nor interfere with the em-
ployer's business. See Note (1928) 41 HAgv. L. REv. 770. A "yellow dog"
agreement is set forth in Hitchman v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65(1917).2 N. Y. PENAL CODE, §1171a, L. 1887, c. 688. It was held unconstitutional
in People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. at 1073 (1906).
Erdman Act, June 1, 1898, c. 370 §10.
" Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1915). In addition about a dozen state
supreme court decisions to the same effect have established that it cannot be
made a criminal offense for employers to require their employees to agree that
they would not join unions.
